



## **HOW IS CABO DELGADO?**

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(Coordination)**

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**Vadu Gouden** is the Executive Director of the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), which he founded in 1992. He is a lawyer, mediator, trainer and researcher in the field of conflict management, having been involved in peacebuilding processes in several African countries. He directed the United Nations Security Council on matters relating to conflict management and was elected by the World Economic Forum as one of its Global Leaders for Tomorrow (GLT).

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The order of presentation of the participants follows the sequence of the interventions.



## INDEX

INTRODUCTION .....	1
1. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL RESOURCES .....	2
2. POVERTY, ETHNICITY AND YOUTH.....	4
3. POWER, RELIGION AND CONFLICT .....	7
4. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE CONFLICT.....	11
5. THE MILITARY IMPASSE - ACTORS AND STRATEGIES.....	14
6. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN CABO DELGADO.....	19
7. POPULATION RESETTLEMENTS - WHAT CHALLENGES? .....	21
8. INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT OF CAPE DELGADO IN A CONTEXT OF CONFLICT .....	24
9. CHALLENGES AND EXPERIENCES IN PEACE BUILDING .....	31

## HOW IS CABO DELGADO?

### INTRODUCTION

Throughout 2020, there was an intensification of the violence in Cabo Delgado, expressed in the attacks to several district headquarters in the north of the province, cutting access roads and constituting a siege to the district of Palma, the epicenter of the gas economy. The rebels have consolidated their presence in the northeast of the province and leading to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, causing a humanitarian crisis, and diverting international attention to northern Mozambique. It was in this context of increasing escalation of violence and military impasse, that the Observatório do Meio Rural organized a cycle of webinars entitled "How is Cabo Delgado?", bringing together national and international experts, to contribute to a greater understanding of a complex issue.

The meetings dealt essentially with three major sets of issues:

Firstly, the complex internal and external causes of the conflict, exploring issues related to the political economy of natural resources, dimensions of poverty, inequalities, the social situation of youth, political and religious issues, as well as conflict interrelationships with international trafficking routes.

Secondly, the dynamics of the armed conflict, analyzing the actors involved, military strategies and their impacts on the population, especially in terms of forced displacement, humanitarian assistance, and challenges of population resettlement.

Finally, the reflections were directed to the future, seeking to identify ways for sustainable economic development in the North of the country, and for the construction of an effective and lasting peace.

## 1. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Daniel Ribeiro, Edson Cortez and João Mosca<sup>1</sup>

In the global economy, there is a renewed interest in the production of gas, seen as a transitional energy source, while investigating renewable, economically viable forms of energy. In this scenario, the energy and transport corridors on the Mozambique Channel present themselves at a crossroads of international interests. Given the expectations of huge revenues from gas exploration, there is an increase in investment in the extractive gas industry, accompanied by the purchase of military equipment, in scenarios full of corruption and increased external debt, increasing poverty, particularly in the exploration areas.

An extractive and extroverted economy is consolidated, where the productive fabric and the domestic market are put into second place, without links with the local economic fabric and dependent on the fluctuation of prices in international markets.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that Mozambique does not have the capacity to invest and influence the gas value chain, namely the liquefaction, transportation, and distribution process, located in developed countries. Other economic sectors are ignored, such as agriculture or agro-transformation, narrowing the economy to the detriment of more endogenous, integrated, and competitive development, whilst the factors that most reduce poverty and inequality are neglected.

External debt increases in the short term and, in the long term, part of the revenues will serve to pay short-term commitments. Investment in the extractive industry is capital intensive, generating little employment, produces elements of political and social conflict, where ethnic, religious, and other differences are manipulated, based on historical realities, impeding economic and social development.

Access to the State is a condition for the accumulation by the elites in power, structured in alliances based on families, partisans, and ethnic groups, which fluctuate as per change in governance. The development of an extractive gas economy has created high expectations in terms of rent distribution. The increase in the State's presence in Cabo Delgado, a province that has historically been marginalized and marked by poverty and social exclusion, has resulted in an increase in conflict, with the prevailing conviction that foreigners and individuals from the South are the winners.

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<sup>1</sup> Webinar hold on July 14, 2020.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the State defends the interests of multinational companies and not the interests of the populations, for instance, in land allocation and population resettlement, or in the military protection of investments. In scenarios of greater penetration of capital, and the extractive industry, in particular, small conflicts emerge that do not reach greater proportions, due to the existence of a deficit in participatory citizenship, namely access to information, schooling, organization, or to the repressive capacity of the State.

### **SUGGESTIONS:**

These aspects, internal and external, lead to the weakening of the State, which already has little technical and human capacity to conceive a protectionist system of national interests, in terms of legal, fiscal, or environmental. It is suggested that research, debate and advocacy actions at different levels should include: (1) the development model, with a view to diversifying the economy, promoting the development of agriculture and agro-industry, tourism, fisheries and the environmental economy, configuring development corridors from the coast (port of Pemba) to Niassa, and along the coast, supporting the creation of small businesses and the generation of jobs, promoting integration into the national markets and a reduction in regional asymmetries; (2) the interests in the Indian Ocean related to world, European, American and Asian economies, with long-term intervention strategies in various economic areas. These countries, growing consumers of food, energy and raw materials, will seek to relocate their activities to Africa, with the aim of cleaning up their countries, benefiting from cheap labor and gaining advantages in the markets of Europe and the Americas due to geographical proximity.

## 2. POVERTY, ETHNICITY AND YOUTH

Ana Santos, Alcinda Honwana, João Feijó and João Carrilho<sup>2</sup>

The analysis of power relations in the province of Cabo Delgado over the last century reveals the existence of multiple socio-political cleavages, based on the following aspects:

- **Geographic:** At the end of the XIX century, the transfer of the administrative capital from Ilha de Moçambique to Lourenço Marques started a long process of imbalance between the North and the South of the country, in terms of public investment, development and socio-economic integration, a phenomenon that continued after independence. At a time when the Province of Cabo Delgado is becoming worldwide known for the explored natural resources, poverty rates in the province remain among the highest in the country, with a worsening trend.

- **Ethnic:** The province is a space marked by ethnic-linguistic diversity, with emphasis on the peoples on the coast (mostly Islamic, traders, and economically integrated in the Indian Ocean) and the people of the plateau (mostly Makonde, historically under the influence of Christian missions, and integrated into markets through mandatory agricultural crops). In the rest of the province, the Macuas predominate. As a result of the strong involvement in the liberation struggle led by Frelimo, the Makonde population acquired, after independence, an important political and economic visibility, reconfiguring power relations in the province. Frelimo's anticlerical policies, the denial of ethnic specificities and the ethnic-linguistic disproportionality in the access to positions in the State, subsidies, or licenses to exploit natural resources, have been triggering resentment among coastal peoples, with increasing intensity. Despite phenomena of interethnic coexistence, including through family relations, the reality is that discourses of envy, disgust, and denial of the Other persist, not only between Makonde, on the one hand, and Muanis and Macuas on the other, but also between locals and outsiders, between North and South populations (known as Maputo) or between Mozambicans and foreigners.

- **Politic:** the social discontent of the populations from the coast and from the south of the province was skillfully capitalized by the Renamo party, both during the 16-year war and after the conclusion of the General Peace Agreement, where it built an important electoral support base.

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<sup>2</sup> Webinar hold on July 14, 2020.

- **Generational:** emerging youth in a situation of waithood, with strong difficulties of socio-economic integration, competes not only with older and established generations, but also among themselves, often for low-paid and socially no prestigious jobs. In a scenario of consolidation of an extractive and extroverted economy, with few relations with the local economic fabric and little generating employment, young people seek for solutions in the informal sector, often at the margins of legality. In a scenario of greater access to information, the coexistence of phenomena of poverty in an emerging consumer society and the frustration of the high initial expectations surrounding extractive activities contributed to the worsening of tensions. The situation is aggravated by the absence of formal channels for socio-political participation and negotiation, with feelings of absence of political representation, contributing to the development of a perspective of violence, as a legitimate vehicle for participation.

- **Class:** The establishment of the extractive industry generated international migrations, a strong pressure on land and natural resources, contributing to the increase of social inequalities, partly structured around the different possibilities of access to the State and, through it, subsidies, jobs and natural resources.

## **SUGGESTIONS:**

In this scenario of deep cleavages, the province of Cabo Delgado has become a center of dispute of international energy interests, inevitably generating security businesses, and the action of radical groups, which have skillfully adapted a messianic and jihadist discourse to local social contradictions, capturing a social support base.

Considering these data, it is important to:

- Carry out more studies and research in order to understand the complexity of local tensions and conflicts;

- Reflect on the impact of military violence on populations, the aggravation of social resentments, and reproduction of the conflict, considering the involvement of the military engineering and medical staff in assisting the affected populations;

- Strong investment in public services, in terms of education, health, transport, energy and infrastructure to support economic activities;

- Diversify the economy and strongly support small economic activities (fishing and aquaculture, agriculture and agribusiness, workshops, transport, commerce and services) that generate local employment and promote market integration;

- Diversify the benefited populations in terms of gender, religion and ethnolinguistic, paying particular attention to the youth. Any intervention in the region must consider their socio-political sustainability;
- Investment in channels of socio-political participation, involving charismatic local leaders and promoting social cohesion campaigns.

### 3. POWER, RELIGION AND CONFLICT

Eric Morier-Genoud, Saíde Habibe, Liazzat Bonate and Yussuf Adam<sup>3</sup>

The meeting addressed the favoritism that the Catholic Church benefited during the colonial period, which established a set of missions in the Mueda Plateau. The colonial government showed mistrust and hostility towards Islam, even though, with the beginning of the liberation struggle, and to curb the advance of FRELIMO, it tried to get closer to the leaders of the brotherhoods on the coast, of *Sufi* tradition.

All religions groups experienced differences and internal conflicts. In the Islam, it appears that these conflicts date back to the colonial period, structured not only on issues of interpretation of Islam, but also on differences of ethnic, racial, class issues or related to the position regarding the existing power. The colonial State (but also the post-colonial State) tried to take advantage of these differences, or even tried to create and deepen them. As from the 1950s, Salafist-inspired Islamic groups emerged, critical of the *Sufi* tradition that existed in northern Mozambique, creating divergences that persist until today.

Defending a modernist, secular nation-state project in the post-independence period, secularist and sometimes anti-clerical measures were implemented, which created resentment among believers. More educated and closer to the big cities, the Salafist-influenced Islamists had a better relationship with the central power. In 1983 the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO) was formed, with a centralized structure, with its leadership residing in the south of the country and associated with political and economic power. By comparison, the *Sufis* in northern Mozambique were less involved with the state and had more difficulty in accessing international Islamic organizations the majority of which supported CISLAMO. *Sufis* developed a sense of economic and socio-political exclusion. Even though many are not linked to any political party, there was a discontent with the central power among the leaders of Islamic brotherhoods in the North, which was politically capitalized by Renamo.

With the 1990 Constitution and greater religious freedom that it brought, a strong penetration of new religious organizations took place – namely evangelic and Pentecostal churches – and of foreign missionaries, bringing in a strong effort in translation of religious documents. The penetration of these groups broke, in many places, the hegemony of the Catholic Church and of certain Christian groups, having occurred a growing hybridism at the level of rituals, with people adhering to more than one religion at the same time. There were

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<sup>3</sup> Webinar hold on August, 19, 2020.



also new Islamic international organizations, mainly coming from the Persian Gulf, as the World Muslim League (Liga Mundial Muçulmana) and the Africa Muslim Agency, mostly with relations with the Government or CISLAMO. In a scenario of increased competition between religious organizations, political parties tried to approach and attract these organizations, especially during electoral periods, to the advantage of all sides. Taking advantage of the religious knowledge of its members, its proximity to the State, its economic power, and racial and class characteristics, CISLAMO differs from the others for its rigid interpretation of Islam.

It was in the context of multiplication of new religious organizations and new currents that, in various districts in northern Mozambique, young people recently graduated in Muslim countries opposed local religious institutions and the State, joining in a movement they called *Ahl al-Sunna* (followers of the tradition) or *Ansar al-Sunna* (companions of Prophet Muhammad), called by the local population as *al shabaab* (or young people). They created their own mosques, forbade their believers to attend public schools and applied Sharia law among them, affirming a political and religious program. The groups organized themselves into cells, with mobilization activities, having become more aggressive in their speech against the State. Some members of the movement have become isolated and incompatible with the rest of the Muslim population, with both the brotherhoods in northern Mozambique and with CISLAMO. Interpreting the situation as another religious conflict, framed by the historical contradictions within Islam, the State chose not to intervene actively. Some members of this movement opted for violence, absorbing disaffected youth, including non-Muslims. After three years of military conflict, the insurgents have changed profoundly, containing in their ranks foreigners and Mozambicans born in Tanzania, with cross-border identities. Their members are heterogeneous, being recruited violently and by kidnapping or by means of enticement, including those with criminal cadaster and minors.

Islamic organizations, such as CISLAMO, CIMO, the Islamic Community of Cabo Delgado and the Aga Kahn Foundation, have adopted a position of repudiation and condemnation of the behaviour of this armed group. All these organizations work with the Government to help the conflict displaced as well as to help preventing the spread of extremism.

Although the discontent in Northern Mozambique is expressed in religious language and symbolism, all the webinar speakers agreed that this is not a religious conflict. An analysis of the penetration of religious organizations in Northern Mozambique, their respective support bases, and forms of conflict, deserve to be understood in the historical context and in the context of the political economy of the region, namely:

- Disintegration of agriculture and markets, worsening food insecurity, persistence of poverty and social inequalities;

- Consolidation of an economic model based on capital intensive investment that generates little employment, and little State investment in non-mega projects areas or public services;
- Increased pressure on land and forced resettlement, including disruption of access and exploitation of natural resources;
- Aggressive forms of capital penetration, invariably in alliance with the State, and absence of channels for youth socio-political participation;
- Hegemony of groups linked to the power in obtaining licenses and concessions;
- Migratory phenomena and increased competition between locals and newcomers for the access to scarce resources;
- Increasing number of young people without jobs, with frustrated, but high expectations and with no prospects for the future.

With limited possibility for participation, young people are coerced into following the proselytizing of Muslim groups who have studied abroad, being exposed to Salafist and Wahhabi Islamic ideologies, increasing local cleavages.

It is in this scenario that it is important to consider the following aspects:

- Need for greater access and research on the ground, with a view to understand extremist movements, their composition and leadership;
- Analysis of other areas of Mozambique marked by social exclusion phenomena, preventing ways of penetrating by, and of adhering to, radical groups;
- Greater economic diversification of investments and improvement of public services;
- Policies to support young women, in terms of extending schooling, postponing and reducing natality, contributing to a more balanced demographic pyramid in the medium term;
- Understanding the history of the various Islamic organizations, including inside the organizations themselves;
- Respect and tolerance, by religious leaders, of the heterogeneity of cultural practices of the populations and creation of channels for debate and participation;

- Definition of mechanisms for the reintegration of insurgents into the communities they belong to, rejecting practices of brutal violence by the defence and security forces;
- Creation of platforms constituted by the various religious organizations, involving Christians, Muslims, and other religious organizations, in search of solutions for the deceleration and interruption of the military conflict, giving priority to local organizations.

## 4. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE CONFLICT

César Guedes, Egna Sidumo, Énio Chingotuane and François Vreÿ<sup>4</sup>

### Security threats in the Indian Ocean

In the last decade violence and threats to maritime security have increased in various parts of the Indian Ocean (Philippines, Sri Lanka, Gulf of Aden), including in the Western Coast (namely in Somalia and Yemen). The threats affected maritime navigation and trade, increasing security costs. Actions of violence have impacted negatively on coastal communities as well as on the hinterland. In northern Mozambique, a complex set of phenomena triggered the emergence of armed insurgents, who also operate from the sea, threatening offshore gas investments. Mozambique has become the target of threat from terrorist groups. International indexes on land and maritime governance raise concerns about security and the implementation of the rule of law, citizen participation and respect for human rights (Mo Ibrahim index), and about issues of maritime governance (Stable Seas Index).

### The Mozambique Channel - transport corridor and security challenges

Due to the increased exploitation of natural resources (coal, gas, wood, and other commodities), the revitalization of the international corridors of Nacala, Beira and Maputo, and the consolidation of an extractive, extroverted economy, greater importance has been allocated to the Mozambique Channel, as a maritime transport corridor, raising questions about safety and environmental risk. In addition, the importance of depleting fishing resources leads to the need of inspecting the industrial fishing activities. It is worth noting that there are multiple land and sea borders to the north of the Mozambique Channel, some under dispute, involving Tanzania, Mozambique, Comoros, Mayotte (France) and Madagascar.

At the same time, Mozambique and its coast constitute an important corridor for trafficking of human beings, with networks for illegal migration, smuggling of arms, gemstones, forest and wildlife products (especially ivory), illicit fishery, involving criminal networks that often have close relations with political power. In addition, the heroin trafficking route, known as the Southern route, originating in Afghanistan and the Makran coast (Pakistan and Iran), includes the passage through the East African coast to South Africa, and Europe, is being consolidated. Traffickers select places of political and social instability, and weak government, strategically moving from Somalia to Kenya and Tanzania, and, more recently, to Mozambique. In December 2019, authorities intercepted two vessels at different

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<sup>4</sup> Webinar hold on September, 9, 2020.

moments, one from Iran and the other from Pakistan carrying a total of one tonne of pure heroine.

Mozambique is also a country producing Cannabis, which is the drug most intercepted by the authorities. The detention in Maputo, in April 2020, of the Brazilian drug trafficker Fuminho, linked to the cocaine traffic, raises suspicions of the presence of traffick networks involving this product.

### **The challenge of establishing a regional intervention force**

After 1994, SADC member countries made progress on a common security policy, with the aim of ensuring peace and stability in the region. However, this policy does not work autonomously and is dependent on the political will of each State, hence the mutual defense pact has never operationalized. Despite the perception of historic friendly relations between the countries of the region, the fact that a large part of the liberation movements moved into government and are still in power, and of joint patrolling actions of borders (albeit far from the desired levels), there was no intervention by SADC countries in face of a common security threat. A number of factors has prevented this intervention, namely: i) the lack of the same perception of insecurity among the different countries; ii) defense budget cuts in the RSA, the region's major military power, especially after the media coverage of alleged financial scandals in the acquisition of arms; iii) the need for accountability to the respective national parliaments when sending troops to Cabo Delgado; iv) strong pressure from public opinion and reluctance to send thousands of young people to engage in a conflict that does not lend itself to military solutions only.

Because it does not imply accountability to neighboring countries' parliaments, the option for mercenary groups (namely the Wagner group, and, more recently, the Dick Advisory Group) was the most politically agile solution, although it does not offer the same guarantees in terms of transparency to public opinion.

### **(In)capacity of defense and security forces, and vulnerability of sovereignty**

The failed attempt to establish a coastal and maritime defense fleet and the absence of a properly equipped air force, deprived the Mozambican State of the ability to effectively patrol the coast, protect large economic projects, police economic fishing zones, and combat different types of trafficking. Without autonomy of action, the Mozambican State becomes particularly vulnerable to threats, and dependent on the intervention of other States or economic security groups.

## **PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE**

The possibility of an international military intervention in Mozambique raises complex issues related with leadership of joint operations in terms of financing and command the operations as well as information sharing and complex negotiations.

On the other hand, the conflict in Northern Mozambique consolidates as a stage of military conflict, there are several scenarios for the heroin traffic: i) the hypothesis of the route moving further south, involving the provinces of Nampula down to Gaza; or, ii) the route is consolidated as people abandon the corridors of drug trafficking. Although there is no evidence of alliances between drug traffickers and armed insurgents, the reality is that such phenomenon has occurred in other parts of the world (particularly in Colombia, Peru, Myanmar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and countries in the Sahel), therefore, it is important to consider this possibility. On the other hand, international experience shows that drug transit countries eventually become countries of consumption, as is already being registered in South Africa. They can also become places of exacerbated levels of drug related violence (Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Central American countries) involving local gangs and international syndicates.

### **SUGGESTIONS:**

There is the need to consider the following aspects:

- Creation of transnational research networks and conduct comparative studies in the region, on phenomena of insecurity;
- Greater international cooperation in the management of common threats, involving, if necessary, the support of the United Nations. In this respect, it is important to note the recent presence of UNODC in Mozambique, at the Government's request;
- Consideration of land and maritime security policies in an interconnected way;
- Strengthening the technical and human capacity in terms of maritime governance in the Mozambique Channel;
- Institutional strengthening of organizations related with criminal investigation and justice.

## 5. THE MILITARY IMPASSE - ACTORS AND STRATEGIES

Yussuf Adam, Johann Smith, Tom Bowker and Fernando Mbanze<sup>5</sup>

### The liberation struggle

Despite the existence of multiple narratives, the reality is that the official history of Mozambique presents the Province of Cabo Delgado as the stage for the beginning of the national liberation struggle, with the attack to the Chai administrative post, on September 25, 1964. Crossing the Rovuma River from north to south, the guerrillas spread through the ground, forcing the withdrawal of the colonial administration in various areas of the Mueda plateau. In the liberated areas, civil and military administration were under Frelimo, having built an important social base of support among the population. Seeking to isolate the population from the influence of Frelimo, the colonial troops implemented several settlements south of the Montepuez River (with access to water, sanitation, and other social conditions), as well as a series of military bases close to the areas where the guerrillas operate, turning a war of movement into a war of positions. Those suspected of belonging to Frelimo were arrested and tortured and, the overwhelming majority, executed.

### The Renamo-Frelimo conflict

A decade after independence of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado experienced a period of military stability. However, the adoption of a modernizing and authoritarian model of rural development, defined by the central government, resulted in situations of forced displacement to establish communal villages or re-education camps, generating resentment among the population.

In the mid-1980s, the first Renamo attacks occurred in the province, whose guerrillas crossed river Lúrio (from South to North), quickly spreading to all districts, especially in the South of the province, where the most important armed interventions were unleashed. Renamo guerrillas did not fail to win some support from the population, including in the Mueda Plateau. To protect its facilities from Renamo attacks, the cotton company LOMACO<sup>6</sup>, in the Montepuez district, created its own army, with British commanders and Gurkhas mercenaries (from Nepal), also involving Mozambican soldiers and militias.

After the signing of the General Peace Agreement, the (inter)national priority was directed towards development aid. There was a divestment in the Armed Forces of Mozambique,

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<sup>5</sup> Webinar hold on September, 1, 2020.

<sup>6</sup> LOMACO – Lonrho-Mozambique Agricultural Company

along with distrust regarding the integration of Renamo military personnel. Military training was classic, ignoring the management of unconventional conflicts.

In the post-war period, Renamo continued to gain widespread popular support in Cabo Delgado, particularly in the South of the province and along the coast. Sporadically, violent episodes have been recorded, especially during electoral periods.

### **The beginning of the *machababos* war**

In a context of disintegration of agriculture, migratory movements to coastal areas, strong pressure on land, limited channels for political participation, violent penetration of extractive capital and frustrated high social expectations, from 2015 there were reports on the presence of armed groups, with a discourse associated with Islamic practices and being organized as a counterpower to the State.

In 2017, the first armed clashes took place, with the attack to State targets in the municipality of Mocímboa da Praia. The Defense and Security Forces (DSF) responded with violence. Contrary to initial expectations, the conflict spread to neighboring districts and, three years later, the movement was consolidated in the Northeast of Cabo Delgado. Insurgents appear to operate in small groups and cells, with the capacity for communication and military training.

The group is locally called *machababos*, being mostly composed of young people from various areas of northern Mozambique, with a special focus on coastal areas, including Tanzanians (some of Mozambican descent). In recent years there has been an internationalization of the conflict, with the entry of Russian mercenaries, and later, from South Africa, in support of the DSF, as well as foreigners in support of the insurgents. Some activities of the group are divulged by the Islamic State, claiming the authorship, in a propaganda war.

### **The current situation of military impasse**

From March 2020 onwards, started a new phase of the conflict, with a stronger intensity of clashes of *machababos* with DSF and civilians, with attacks and longer occupation of the main villages: Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, Quissanga and Macomia. In April 2020, insurgents threatened Pemba, the provincial capital, and the village of Mueda, two important political centers. It is in this context that the DAG group acted, offering aerial support to the military on the ground, complementing the new armored vehicles recently purchased from China, in unpublished deals. The media reports financial support from the oil industry to



defense and security forces that allegedly do not reach soldiers. Inserted in a propaganda war, news emerged that the DSF took enemy bases.

Despite the counteroffensive led by the DSF, *machababos* continued to make their raids into isolated villages, occupying, since August 2020, the village of Mocímboa da Praia, including the port, disrupting communication with the entire Northeast of province.

De-population has contributed to a drastic decrease in reports about what happens on the ground. Even so, there are news about the movement of troops to the Northeast of the province and ambushes in the districts of Muidumbe and Mocímboa. Air support has shown to be limited, not only by the short period of operation (helicopters can only resupply in Pemba), but also because the insurgents hide in houses and ruins, in dense forest covered areas. There are also difficulties in terms of logistical assistance to the military, evacuation and medical treatment, and revelation of dead and missing military personnel, often without identification. In this scenario, the morale of many young members of the DSF is reduced. The reports refer to the construction of trenches by the insurgents, in defense of Mocímboa da Praia and the port, with the expectation of a major attack to recover the village. Likewise, the cities of Mueda and Pemba remain under threat of attack.

Guerrilla action of these groups are similar to the guerrilla tactics of Frelimo and Renamo, namely compulsory recruitment practices and the use of populations for logistical support (storage and transport of weapons, loading of stolen goods and access to food). In Mocímboa, Macomia and Quissanga, food stores were looted, and food was subsequently distributed to the population, revealing an attempt to consolidate a social base of support. Despite the countless reports of interaction with the local population, *machababos* are distinct from previous guerrilla movements by the greater brutality of their practices towards the population, particularly in terms of the destruction of houses and the dismemberment of civilians. Among the victims of the conflict, women stand out, with the abduction of hundreds of young people, used for logistical support and as sex slaves.

The fact that many civilians do not collaborate with the DSF has led to violent retaliation, expressed in reports and videos that circulate on social networks. As in previous conflicts, the conduct of government forces is also characterized by violence against civilians. The violence of the confronting parties over civilians and the fact that the gas projects remain untouched, trigger numerous discourses, among civilians, about an alleged intention to expel the populations from their lands, without compensations. The reality is that a vast area of Northeastern Cabo Delgado is now uninhabited. Women and children are clearly over-represented in some camps for internal displaced persons. Researchers and journalists wonder about the whereabouts of young adults.

The difficulty in understanding what is happening on the ground stems from the Government's reluctance to communicate with the press and journalists, even when the DSF are successful. The DSF's hostility towards journalists is evident in the disappearance, imprisonment, and aggression of several media professionals in the exercise of their function, which translates into greater danger of reporting. This situation leads to a greater recurrence of second-hand reports, provided by eyewitnesses, which always raises reservations about the information obtained. The reality is that the use of citizen reporters means greater access to information about the war, at least by comparison with previous conflicts.

### **What prospects for Cabo Delgado?**

The current scenario leads us to believe that, in the coming years, there will be a militarization of the Northeast of Cabo Delgado, with all the villages abandoned and the establishment of security corridors, a catastrophic scenario for the civilian population. Analysts in the debate considered that the normal period for an insurgency to become a serious problem is approximately three years (stage already reached), with the conflict resolution period tending to take between 7 and 10 years. It is expected that the current generation of young Mozambicans will be sacrificed in this conflict. To shorten the period of conflict and avoid the sacrifice of more generations of Mozambicans, it is important to consider the following aspects:

- More research: The work of researchers and journalists (as well as other technicians, namely of humanitarian assistance) must be considered and it is important that the authorities trust and relate in good faith with them. Researchers and journalists must be understood as Mozambican citizens committed to the understanding and problem solving, so they should not be the target of hostile threats;
- Organizations of journalists, as well as civil society, must express a more vehement condemnation of the obstacles to information to professionals and researchers;
- To win a war, it is important to have a good relationship with the population, so that it is important that authorities consider and respect Human Rights. This implies the creation of communication channels with the population, as well as the investigation and condemnation of abuses of authority;
- Resettlements of populations must be carried out properly and meet the needs of the population, including security and justice.
- Strengthening the development and economic integration of the territory: A military victory will only be possible when the country is economically more inclusive, which means a strong investment in more and better public services (education, health, energy, etc.), and a support

for economic activities. Northern Integrated Development Agency could play an important role in the North of Cabo Delgado.

- Rethink the extractive model of development, as well as the fiscal benefits granted to megaprojects, in order to finance security costs;
- Search for regional solutions to a conflict that is regional;
- Identification of charismatic local leaders, including among insurgents, and look for their international connections;
- Creation of mechanisms of dialogue, interaction and tolerance between religious groups and rival factions.

## 6. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN CABO DELGADO

Manuel Nota, Mahomedzicar Osman and João Feijó<sup>7</sup>

The countless difficulties experienced by about half a million of displaced people in the province of Cabo Delgado related with:

- a) **Accommodation:** leaving to stay with family members and friends living elsewhere, crowding several families in small dependencies, sleeping in verandas and backyards, exposed to malaria. Others are installed in improvised schools and accommodation centers, with countless families concentrated under the same tent, without masks and protective instruments and exposed to malaria;
- b) **Access to water and sanitation:** the great population concentration puts pressure on sanitation systems. In accommodation centers there are ratios of 1 latrine for more than 30 families, aggravating the practice of open defecation, resulting in outbreaks of diarrhea and cholera;
- c) **Food assistance,** making the food distribution to ever greater number of people an extreme challenge;
- d) **Medical assistance,** in terms of availability of medicines, treatment of malaria and cholera, including psychological counseling;
- e) The situation worsened with the pandemic of **COVID-19**, being the province of Cabo Delgado one of community transmission hot spots.

A great part of population remains in conflict zones, hidden in the bush, without access to humanitarian assistance centers. Most of the health units in the Northeast of Cabo Delgado were attacked, looted, or destroyed, having the medical and nursing staff fled to Pemba, Mueda or Montepuez, making the health services unavailable in the areas of greater or more frequent military confrontation.

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<sup>7</sup> Webinar hold on June, 30, 2020.

Given this situation, it is important to enhance the following aspects:

- a) the need to increase humanitarian donations (cash, food, hygiene kits), channeled to INGC or to civil society organizations operating on the ground;
- b) Impossibility of providing indefinitely food for displaced populations, making it necessary to provide support for the creation of small businesses, job creation and food production;
- c) The need to create mechanisms to reverse the cycle of violence in the region, promoting the economic and social inclusion of young people and reducing the potential for recruitment for violent purposes;
- d) Rethink the military strategy, involving medical and engineer units of the DSF in the creation/repair of infrastructures (water holes, sanitation, health units) and medical assistance to the population in regions where insurgents find their social support base;
- e) In a scenario of destruction of school infrastructure, or their occupation with displaced, and the existence of displaced children without identification documents or certificates of qualifications, the restart of the academic year in Cabo Delgado province will be an huge challenge, especially in the situation of community transmission of COVID19.

## 7. POPULATION RESETTLEMENTS - WHAT CHALLENGES?

Mohsin Abdulcarimo, Eduardo Carrilho, Aparecida Queiroz and Luís Augusto<sup>8</sup>

### Problem dimensions

The intensification of the military conflict in Cabo Delgado has already provoked the displacement of around half a million individuals, most of whom have fled to the areas surrounding the conflict, extending into the neighboring provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado. Populations move according to available resources, namely the capacity for financing transport, the existence of family members at destination locations, and information available in terms of food aid. In several districts, camps for displaced persons were formed, concentrating tens of thousands of individuals. Likewise, several neighborhoods in the city of Pemba host thousands of displaced people, including those coming by sea, leading to population densification, saturation of urban infrastructure and increasing informality.

Many of these individuals, who already lived in poverty and with immense deprivation, have now lost resources and material goods and became totally dependent on aid. The first major difficulty faced by humanitarian assistance is food support, followed by the need to provide accommodation conditions (tents, mats, and mosquito nets). Despite the efforts of many humanitarian organizations and local entrepreneurs, food distribution and shelter building has been insufficient for dimensions of the problem.

The displaced are psychologically affected by violence and loss of resources, vulnerable, and in need of psychosocial support. Many individuals are unaware of the family members whereabouts and mourn the loss of loved ones, invariably violently. Failure to perform funeral rites or initiation rites generates additional anxiety.

### Competition for access to resources

The sudden arrival of tens of thousands of individuals has increased pressure and competition for access to scarce resources, generating fears on the part of host populations. Not yet recovered from shocks resulting from floods and destruction of crops, for many host populations the new arrivals represent additional competition, but also the arrival of the armed conflict. So, they tend to relate with distrust and aggression. The situation is reflected, not only in resettlement camps, but also in host families, themselves also affected by the conflict and decapitalized by the interruption of commercial circuits, due to the conflict or

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<sup>8</sup> Webinar hold on December, 14, 2020.

to the declaration of State of Emergency. Because food is not enough for all individuals, community leaders and local non-displaced families try to take advantage generating conflicts during the food distribution process. There are reports of hunger, diversion of humanitarian aid and supply vouchers.

### **Challenges socio-economic reintegration of the population**

Displaced populations have multiple perspectives regarding the future. For some, resettlement represents the hope for restarting socio-economic activities (agricultural or livestock production, etc.), albeit persistence of insecurity and uncertainty about military activities. Others expressed their willingness to return to their original space and recover previously held resources, although feeling fear and anxiety. Family future projects tend to be influenced by the different experiences of families with armed groups, namely abductions, destruction of houses, mutilations, murders, etc.

The resettlement of hundreds of thousands of individuals will present a major challenge in terms of infrastructure and public services, access to water and sanitation, education, and health, but also to electrification and commercial network. In this sense that there is an urgent need to implement an integrated development project in Northern Mozambique. Given the urgency of the situation and the growing difficulties faced by humanitarian organizations in ensuring food assistance, the implementation of interventions cannot take long months. The arrival of the rains, the risk of a cholera epidemic and the need to reestablish production conditions, makes intervention urgent.

A project for the population socio-professional reintegration should consider aspects such as:

- Socio-professional characterization of the displaced population, identifying skills and professional experiences, and defining intervention plans with different supporting packages for starting or expanding different economic activities;
- Urgent expansion of the professional training network, involving existing partners in the field, including religious organizations with a vocation for technical education. It is recommended the urgent organization of intensive and short-term professional courses in technical areas demanded locally;
- Socio-psychological monitoring of the victims, reconstruction of trust and ties with the places of origin, requiring the training and involvement of local specialists and community leaders in this process;

- Need to expand the local content to the humanitarian industry, acquiring local or national production or integrating local young people in this process, capitalizing their knowledge of the local reality;
- Greater participation and inclusion in the process of defining resettlement sites, involving displaced and indigenous populations. It is important to guarantee the population the right to the areas involuntarily abandoned.
- The need for the large oil & gas industry to intensify its social responsibility projects, focusing on training, health support and local content.

### **The Oil & Gas industry - cause or solution for the problem?**

Although gas exploration may generate revenue for the Mozambican State, the reality is that these large private projects have not provided support to alleviate the humanitarian problem. In a scenario characterized by widespread illiteracy, lack of technical and professional skills and decapitalization of local entrepreneurs, chances are that the oil & gas projects will only marginally absorb local labor. In fact, the best job offers are being filled with foreigners or people from the South of the country. A very small group of local individuals will have access to the subordinate positions, that demand low qualifications and offer the lowest wage levels, such as security guards or cleaning assistants, increasing social inequalities between locals and outsiders.

Although they may have a palliative effect, the support of oil & gas projects, as part of their social responsibility, will not have a transforming impact on reality. So, there is an urgent need to rethink the entire development model of Mozambique, in general, and the North of the country, in particular, giving preference to labor-intensive models, more closely related with the local markets, with multiplier effects on the economy and on job creation. An integrated solution to the conflict should favor investment in farming, fishing, agro-processing, as well as small workshops and local services, among other projects. It is necessary to have a wide national debate on the development models for the country, as well as the establishment of stable, consistent, and long-term public policies.



## 8. INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT OF CAPE DELGADO IN A CONTEXT OF CONFLICT

Jerry Maquenzi, João Feijó, António Souto, João Mosca and Abdul Carimo<sup>9</sup>

### A socio-economic diagnosis of the province

The province stands out for the abundance of valuable natural resources, namely fishing resources, forest, ivory, precious stones, and gas. Despite being an area of growing economic investment, the latest survey of the household budget found an increase in poverty (consumption and multidimensional) in the North of the country, in general. The province of Cabo Delgado stands out from the rest of the territory for higher rates of illiteracy, poor access to energy and ownership of durable goods, and financial exclusion. However, the province of Cabo Delgado is a heterogeneous space, with different levels of socio-economic development.

Representing the epicenter of natural gas industry investment, the **district of Palma** has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the province. The existence of technical and professional schools in the district is not known. Palma also stands out for the high incidence of open defecation and financial exclusion. In terms of economic activities, the district stands out in rice production and poultry farming.

Predominantly populated by Makonde and Christian people, the population on the Mueda plateau has a higher rate of housing covered with conventional material, and strong concentration of beneficiaries of the former combatant's pension, two characteristics closely associated, at least in the speeches of local populations. Election results reveal a strong tendency to vote for Frelimo. The district's population has high levels of poverty, although less evident in terms of access to energy or durable goods. In terms of economic activities, the plateau stands out for the production of maize, sweet potatoes and pig farming.

Due to the conflict, the **coastal districts** (Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, Quissanga, adding the Muidumbe district) are largely depopulated and without State administration. Before the conflict, the coastal districts were mostly Islamic, with fishing activity assuming a high economic importance, combined with trade, agricultural production (particularly cassava and rice) and livestock (chickens and goats). The electoral results show that, in the coastal areas, the opposition parties have gained an important social support base.

In the **central interior** of the province (namely in the districts of Montepuez and Balama) the levels of poverty tend to be less evident, either due to the presence of public services and infrastructures (including the Pemba-Lichinga corridor), or by the existence of

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<sup>9</sup> Webinar hold on December, 3, 2020.

supporting infrastructure for agribusiness (particularly around crops such as cotton, sesame and rice), or by complementing other non-agricultural activities (trade, exploitation of forest resources, mining, among others).

The **Southern interior** of the province (Namuno and Chiúre districts) is the most populous region, with agriculture as its main activity. It is in the South of the province that the highest poverty rates are observed in Cabo Delgado (in terms of illiteracy, deprivation of safe sanitation, coverage of the house with conventional material, access to energy and durable goods, such as mobile phones), registering a high incidence of endemic diseases.

Around urban areas (mainly in Pemba and Montepuez) indicators such as literacy indicators, doctor per inhabitant, access to energy, house roofing with conventional materials, access to durable goods or financial inclusion, are improved. The data allow us to conclude that, in the areas where the population depends most on agriculture, there are higher levels of poverty, remedied by the growing access to non-agricultural activities, such as small commerce, mining or exploitation of forest resources.

### **Transformations generated by the armed conflict**

The armed conflict has had a profound impact on the province, namely:

- a) Abandoning crops and economic activities, contributing to inflation of staple products and food insecurity;
- b) Forced displacement of around half a million individuals, who are mainly concentrated on the periphery of conflict zones, posing great difficulties to humanitarian assistance;
- c) Violence and mistrust on the population and on countless entrepreneurs, suspected of financing insurgent groups or money laundering;
- d) Increase of poverty and unemployment among the youth and the respective recruitment potential (voluntary and / or forced) for violent groups;
- e) Great difficulty in producing statistics and increasing uncertainty in relation to the local reality;


## **In a context of conflict, what possibilities for development?**

Even though over the last decades several strategic development plans have been carried out in the province of Cabo Delgado, including the development of agro-business and agro-transformation, small rural services, the reality is that we are witnessing the consolidation of an extractive and extroverted economy, based on capital intensive investment led by big capital, with little relation with local markets and little capacity of job creation. It is an economy strongly dependent on the variation of raw material international prices (gas, timber, ivory, precious stones), which the country cannot control.

Although the government created, about 6 months ago, the Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN), people still wait for the response of this organization on the ground. The reality is that the frustration of initial expectations led to a process of dissatisfaction and exclusion of different segments of the population, which is important to understand, with sensitivity, to better intervene. Military intervention on the ground can only become sustainable and effective if it is complemented with a broad counterinsurgency strategy.


### **a) Identification of different socio-economic areas**

Economic investment in the province of Cabo Delgado is largely hampered by the spread of armed attacks, which today affect vast areas of the coast and penetrate the plateau (map 1). Hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals are concentrated in the periphery of the attacked areas, mainly composed of populations without the capacity to move to more remote areas, often single-parent families headed by women. It is in these districts that most humanitarian aid and investment needs are concentrated.



Considering this new reality (military insecurity, internal migration and the need for resettlement and socio-economic integration of hundreds of thousands of individuals), considering the different agro-ecological conditions, the existing infrastructure, and socio-economic conditions, it is possible to distinguish six different areas in Cabo Delgado province, with different investment potentials (see map 3):

**Map 3: Different geographical areas and possible investment in Cabo Delgado province**



### b) SOS urgency youth Cabo Delgado

Facing this reality, it is urgent the develop economic models based on intensive work, by supporting agro-business, agro-transformation and the development of small services (transport, commerce or small workshops), targeting the youth in particular. Economic protection of youth is, in fact, the best prevention strategy to involvement with violent groups. Appeals to non-adherence to radical groups will only be effective if complemented with socio-economic assistance. Due to the role of women, mothers, and educators (and therefore in preventing radicalization), and as food producers, economic assistance to women has a positive impact on all members of the family. So, this social group needs to be prioritized. By promoting women's socio-economic emancipation and, consequently, family planning, support for young women has an impact on reducing fertility and, consequently, poverty.

Based on these premises, Gapi-IS proposes the urgent implementation of a strategy for economic and social development in the province of Cabo Delgado based on three foundations:

- In the **training** and development of technical and professional skills (related to agribusiness, agro-processing, livestock, commercialization, and small services), both in financial literacy and small business management.
- In a **financing** adapted to a situation of political instability and social exclusion, but transparently and professionally managed, based on proximity, without the requirement of traditional financial institutions, and not conditioned to ethnic or party affiliations.
- **Institutional development**, creating and / or upgrading peri-urban markets to function as a "logistical base" for assisting the local economy, formalizing micro-businesses, and expanding the social protection network. By encouraging access to the internet and the use of information and educational programs aimed at young people, as well as on-line payment systems, aiming to reduce population vulnerability around conflict areas.

The development of Cabo Delgado implies the establishment of a coordination center, with the capacity to monitor and create partnerships on the ground, involving the State, religious and humanitarian organizations, development agencies, schools and training centers, the financial sector, and entrepreneurs, as well as research centers.

### **Towards a sustainable solution to the conflict**


A sustainable solution to the conflict implies the use of a set of public policy tools, in a coherent and concerted manner, which must involve the creation/rehabilitation of infrastructure (roads, irrigation, electrification, telecommunications), expansion of services (health, education, agricultural research and extension, financial services and agricultural machinery parks), production factors (seeds, fertilizers and machinery) and market development (developing value chains and price stabilization), as well as macroeconomic policies. In fact, investment plans in infrastructure and services can only be viable if State budget channels resources to sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, or agro-industry, as well as to provinces and districts less integrated into the markets, by granting subsidies to sectors considered strategic for poverty reduction, and monetary and fiscal policies that protect the national producer.



On the other hand, the success of an economic development strategy in the North of the country implies strengthening of institutions in charge of inspection and justice, including the departidization of the State apparatus, the strengthening of the role of the Attorney General's Office and respect for Human Rights, including by elements of the Defense and Security Forces.

Finally, it is important to develop a set of spaces for civic participation, involving the identification of local charismatic leaders, the training of local associations (religious, business, recreational, etc.), advocacy actions with local populations and associations (see table 1). It is the best way to demonstrate to young people that violence is not the (only) possible space for exercising citizenship.

**Table 1: Public policy instruments leading to integrated development**



## 9. CHALLENGES AND EXPERIENCES IN PEACE BUILDING

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### Context of the conflict

A set of fragile African states have emerged, with deep problems of poverty, unemployment, and inequality, with impact on political conflict and sovereignty control. In countries, like Mali, Central African Republic and, more recently, Mozambique, international networks associated with organized crime have been consolidated, generally in alliance with internal groups close to the political power. The State's degradation and fragility creates space for the formation of radical and violent groups, capitalizing on social discontent.

Mozambique is today the victim of Jihadist aggression forces, involving a wide participation of Mozambican citizens. The existing analyzes allow us to understand that the conflict has long-term historical origins, which took new dimensions with the increased pressure for natural resources (land, timber, ivory, precious stones) and with the presence of international trafficking routes of human beings, drugs, and weapons in the Indian Ocean. Despite being a regional and global threat, the conflict in Northern Cabo Delgado is not yet on the UN Security Council's agenda.

After three years of conflict, we are facing a situation of military impasse, and it is important to collect experiences and analyzes related to peace-building processes.

### What is peacebuilding?

Peacebuilding is a multi-step process, being important to distinguish the following steps:

**1) The peace negotiation process**, which leads the parties involved in an armed conflict to analyze the main political, social, economic, and cultural causes that led to the outbreak of violence; from thereon, and seek to constitute an agreement to cease hostilities, providing for conditions of cantonment, disarmament, demobilization, and social reintegration of combatants. Generally, the initiation of a peace negotiation process involves a set of steps, including:

a) Mutual recognition of the impossibility of a military victory, even if one of the parties may have advantage in the theater of operations;

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<sup>10</sup> Webinar hold on October, 20, 2020.



b) Mutual recognition that the parties in conflict come from the same society, and what unites them is as important or more important than what divides them;

c) Identification of legitimate representatives of the parties in conflict, as well as channels of communication between the parties;

d) Building consensus among the involved leaders, which tends to depend on the existence of centralized power structures on both sides; or, on the ability of the leaders to persuade their respective bases, of the advantages of a negotiated solution; and also on the capacity to build relationships based on trust, which implies the construction of a balanced discussion agenda, which covers the main concerns and fears of the parties involved.

The involvement, in the negotiation process, of civil society organizations and prominent leaders, as well as diplomats (from neighboring countries or other regions), possibly as mediators, can play an important role in creating and maintaining a constructive negotiating environment, facilitating the unblocking of contradictions.

**2) The peace consolidation process**, that can be a process as sensitive and complex as the previous one. The fall of the Berlin Wall has generated a broad international consensus, according to which sustainable peace is only possible in a liberal democracy system, where access to political power passes through competitive elections. In an electoral system in which "the winner takes all", the former protagonists of the war become antagonistic political parties. So, during electoral periods, tight political environments are formed, where space for compromise is scarce.

In a reversal of Clausewitz's reasoning, "politics becomes the continuation of war by other means". The demand for competitive elections hampers the complete reconciliation and cooperation of the parties in conflict, in rebuilding the country and in the peacebuilding process. The needs, desires, and aspirations of the greatest victims of war - people in conflict zones - take a peripheral place in the political dynamics of the peace signatories. Facing the incapacity and indifference of the State, as well the conflicting forces, many citizens from rural and peri-urban areas resort to purification rituals, with the aim of promoting their psychosocial integration in a post-conflict period.

In societies deeply wounded and affected by prolonged armed conflicts, electoral competition only becomes constructive if peace signatories are able to build together:

- A common narrative about the war;
- A responsibility sharing agreement on the violence that has plagued the country;
- A joint recognition of national unity.

## **The role of women in conflict contexts**

In a micro-social approach, the role of women in peace building processes was analyzed, through sharing the experiences of solidarity camps for women in conflict-affected areas, an aspect that is often ignored.

Women have not had the opportunity to enjoy the rights predicted in the national peace and security plan, which also include the issues mentioned in United Nations resolution 1325. In demilitarization processes, women are not properly involved in cease fire negotiations, demobilization, and socio-economic reintegration in the negotiation meetings, especially those living in the affected places, who lost their land, homes, and relatives during the conflicts. Women can play a fundamental role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, essentially for two reasons: 1) their decisive role in the production of food, securing the family's food security, thus preventing the adoption of deviant and violent strategies by the male members; 2) its role in family socialization, prevention of violent behavior and social reintegration.

Support to women affected by contexts of violence (in psychosocial terms, training for conflict resolution, financial training, and support to develop economic activities) is a fundamental strategy for building peace.

On the other hand, demilitarization processes must involve affected women as they are the best people to present their needs and build more sustainable processes.

## **Peace building in Cabo Delgado**

Based on these premises, formulated from experience in several African countries, the conflict in Cabo Delgado was analyzed. In a scenario of aggression against the State, it is inevitable a military response, but it must be organized, disciplined, competent and effective. It is essential to carry out training initiatives for the defense and security forces. However, it is also real that we are approaching a situation of exhausting impasse, with incalculable human and economic costs. So, it is essential to research the internal and external causes of the conflict, on which to intervene. It is essential to consider that:

- 1) The existence of different factions in the ruling party and the lack of consensus on how to manage the conflict that destabilizes the State's capacity. So, it is a priority to promote greater governmental unity and conditions for the formation of broader consensus;

2) Strengthening the State capacity, especially for the provision of public services, such as education, health, water, sanitation, energy and transport and communication infrastructure;

3) Promote a transformation of the development model for the region, capable of reversing structural aspects related to the extractive and extroverted economic model, which generates poverty and social exclusion, promoting greater socioeconomic integration of the territory and populations. The Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) may be an answer in this regard;

4) Paying particular attention to ethnolinguistic groups with historical feelings of marginalization;

5) Identification of leaders and intermediaries among insurgent groups and promotion of communication channels. The dominant political discourse that "the enemy has no face" (which also was common during the 1976-1992 war) ignores the possibility by intelligence forces to identify the leaders and representatives, like has been done by journalists and research centers and, eventually, by religious organizations;

6) Identification of terrorist groups international links and block financial and military support processes;

7) Defining a long-term peacebuilding agenda, in which the Government assumes a central role, but involving local Civil Society Organizations (religious organizations and traditional leaders, women and youth groups, academies and research centers), whose members have to be empowered;

8) Organizing workshops and training courses on conflict resolution and inter-generational dialogue, investing in topics about resilience and social cohesion, reconciliation and confidence building, involving State and non-State actors;

9) Strengthening communication between the State and the citizen, creating conditions for dialogue and mutual consultation, promoting public disclosure of State intervention programs, distinguishing short, medium, and long-term actions, and improving transparency and accountability;

10) Conducting research. Peacebuilding depends on the existence of organizations with the capacity to collect credible data on the ground and respective analysis and interpretation, which is a fundamental step in the decision-making process. It is essential to train local staff in data collection and conflict analysis, but also in terms of publication and dissemination of information.